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THISARTICLE STARTS, I N  SECTION1 ,  WITH A BRIEF SUMMARY of Co-
operative Economic Game Theory. It covers the following issues: (1) the 
nature of utility functions, (2) the representation of a decision problem in 
terms of utility functions, (3) the ma-min solution of adecision problem, 
(4) the extension to multiple participants in the decision, (5) the context 
of nonzero-sum games, (6) cooperative decision-making, and (7) the role 
of transferable utilities. 
There then is amore detailed summary of the specific measures iden- 
tified by John F. Nash, Lloyd S. Shapley, andJohn C. Harsanyi. It includes 
a brief discussion of their significance in general economic and social de- 
cision-making in which negotiation and cooperation have important roles. 
There is then a brief review, in Section 2, of contexts in which negoti- 
ation and cooperation among libraries is of special economic importance. 
They include: ( I )  sharing of resources, (2) cooperative acquisitions, ( 3 )  
cooperative automation, (4) shared cataloging, (5)shared storage, and (6) 
preservation and access. 
For two of those contexts-cooperative acquisitions and cooperative 
automation-detailed applications of cooperative game theory are illustrat- 
ed, including use of specific utility functions to represent the decision prob- 
lems and show the results of applying the Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi mea- 
sures for optimum decision and equitable allocation of resources. Numerical 
examples are used to make the illustrations as concrete as possible. 
The article concludes, in Section 3, with abrief description of the im- 
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plementation of the calculations for the two contexts within the LPM-
Library Planning Model. 
SECTION1 .  GAMETHEORETIC FORMODELS 
DECISION-MAKING 
The crucial reference for game theory is the classic book by John von 
Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behuuior 
(1944). 
lhderstanding a Decision Problem 
The starting point for modeling any decision problem must be an un- 
derstanding of the probleni as it is seen by the decision-maker, a definition 
of the objectives of the decision-maker, the identification of alternative 
solutions to the problem, and the formulation of means for representing 
the objectives in a way that can be used to select among the alternative 
answers.All of that may sound self-evident and trite, but each of those steps 
is fraught with difficulty. 
Most fundamentally, there are likely to be decision-making problems 
for the library manager that are not well understood, for which the objec- 
tives are by no means evident, and for which the alternative potential an- 
swers may not be known. The task in modeling in such cases clearly is com- 
plicated and requires an exploration by the library manager with whatever 
professional assistance, such as systems analysis, can be brought to bear. 
Fortunately, though, many of the problems faced by the library man- 
ager are, in principle, well understood, as are the potential solutions of 
them. Even in such cases, though, there still are difficulties in properly 
representing the objectives. To resolve those difficulties requires definition 
of an appropriate “utility function.” 
UtilityFunctions 
Autility function is a means for representing the objectives in a way that 
can be used to select among the alternative answers. To represent the ob- 
jectives, two aspects must be recognized. One is the relative importance of 
the objectives and the second is the scale for assessment individually for each 
of them. In this respect, it is important to note that an unweighted mix of 
criteria, such as “the greatest good for the greatest number,” is irrational; 
one cannot in general optimize two objectives simultaneously. To do so, 
there must be a single criterion, and if there are two or more objectives, 
that criterion must suitably represent their relative importance. It is that 
requirement that makes the utility function necessary.2 
To illustrate, the library manager may have two objectives in mind: (I)  
to decrease the net cost for providing access to materials and (2) to improve 
the effectiveness of service in providing that access. On the surface, the two 
objectives are likely to be in opposition, since decreases in costs are likely 
to result in decreases in services, but the potential solutions may in fact 
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include some that can to some extent meet both objectives. The utility func- 
tion is the means for bringing those two objectives into a single criterion 
for assessing the alternatives. 
This example, simple though it is, highlights the difficulties in crest-
ing a utility function. First, note that while the first objective is, in princi- 
ple, quantitative, with net cost measurable in dollars, the second may be 
essentially qualitative and not adequately assessable in numerical form. 
Second, note that identifylng the relative importance of the two objectives, 
however they may be assessed, is a near impossibility. Indeed, in any real 
situation it may shift as the alternative answers represent different combi- 
nations of costs and effectiveness. 
Despite those difficulties, the process of modeling a decision-making 
problem requires that there be a utility function, and there are means for 
resolving the difficulties. First is to translate the problem of comparison 
among objectives into “quantitative/qualitative”ratios. In the example, that 
would become a “cost/effectiveness” ratio, a measure of “dollars per ser- 
vice pr~vided.”~ Second is to translate, to the extent possible, the qualita- 
tive objectives into quantitative ones. In the example, this might be accom- 
plished by translating “effectiveness” into a combination of measurable 
characteristics, such as “response time” and “frequency of satisfaction.” 
Third, and most fundamental, is to translate the process of assessment into 
relative comparisons of alternative options, which might be represented by 
U(A) > U(B), with U(X) being the utility function, and U(A) and U(B) 
being the respective “values” for options A and B respectively. 
The third means for resolution reflects the fact that the only require- 
ment for the utility function is that it be “order preserving.” Specifically, 
U(A) > U(B) means that option A is preferable to option B (in the order 
of preferences of the decision-maker) . Of course, it may be that two op-
tions are of equal preference, and that is represented by U (A) = U (B).The 
crucial requirement for a utility function is that, for any two options A and 
B, eitherU(A) >U(B), U(A) =U(B), orU(B) >U(A).Inotherwords, there 
must be a means for making the choice and it is not possible for both U(A) 
> U(B) and U(B) > U(A), so the utility function must preserve the order 
of preference. 
Later, when we discuss the application of game theory to cooperative 
decision-making among libraries, the specific mixes of quantitative and 
qualitative objectives appropriate to decisions concerning interlibrary co- 
operation will be discussed. 
Representation of the Decision Pmblem 
Given the existence of a utility function, it is then possible to represent 
the decision problem simply by the assessment of the value of the utility 
function for each of the alternatives available for solution of the problem. 
Expressed in that way, the decision problem appears to be almost trivial 
(even recognizing the possible difficulties in assessing the alternatives). 
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But, of course, real decision problems are not trivial for the very real 
reason that there are usually uncertainties that must be recognized. To 
represent those uncertainties, game theoretic models place the decision 
problem in the framework of potential contexts over which the decision- 
maker has no direct control. Thus, while the decision-maker may face and 
be able to evaluate a set of alternative solutions to a problem, each solu- 
tion must be assessed for its utility in each context and, more to the point, 
the likelihood of each context must also be assessed. 
The game theoretic model is simply a matrix, the TOWSof which are the 
options for alternative solutions, the columns are the contexts, and the 
elements are the utility function assessments: 
Table 1. 
Contexts 
Options 1 2 3 
1 LT11 U12 U13 
2 U21 U22 u 2 3  
3 U31 u32 U33  
4 U41 U42 u43 




ODtions 1 2 3 
~ 
1 -3 -4 7 
2 -5 2 4 
3 1 2 2 
4 0 -2 3 
The usual frame of reference for a game theoretic model is a compet-
itive game, in which the contexts represent the opponent’s strategies for 
play, and the utilities (if positive) are payments to the decision-maker from 
the opponent (or, if negative, from the decision-maker to the opponent). 
Note, that in this case, the player and the opponent each have a utility and 
that they are negatives of each other: (Uij, Vij), with Vij = -Uij. 
With utilities as shown above, the decision-maker might prefer option 
1because its utility is 5 in context 3, but there is the risk of a loss of -4 if 
the opponent plays context 2. How is the best choice to be made? 
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Mux-Min Solution of the Decision Problem 
The classical answer to the choice is “maximize the minimum utility”- 
the “max-min” solution. That is, for each option across the set of contexts, 
there is a least utility for the decision-maker and the choice should be that 
option for which the least utility is the largest. In the numerical example 
above, the answer is option 3, if the three contexts are equally likely. Note 
that the set of minimum utilities for the four options is (-4, -3,1, -2) and 
the maximum of that set occurs at option 3 in context 1. 
If the set of contexts are treated as the potential moves of a competi- 
tor, that person is similarly trying to maximize the minimum utility for him 
(which would be the negatives of the values shown), and the minimum 
utilities would be (-1, -2, -5), the maximum of which again occurs in con- 
text 1,option 3. In either case the result, G, from the game is payment of 1 
from the competitor to the decision-maker. 
In the example, as a game, the best strategies for the two competitors 
produce the same solution, option 3 and context 1.Such a game is one with 
a “saddle-point.” 
Mixed Strateges. There are games without saddle-points and determin- 
ing how best to decide for them requires introduction of what are called 
“mixed strategies” which entail basing the decisions on relative frequencies 
rather than fixed choices. For example, in the children’s game “paper, scis- 
sors, rock,” the best strategy is to make the choice among the three options 
as randomly as possible (unless the opponent reveals an evident bias). Us-
ing such mixed strategies, the decision process always will have a solution 
in the form of relative frequencies for each option that will produce at least 
the minimum expected return (as a counterpart of the max-min solution). 
Determination of the best mixed strategy (i.e., best set of relative fre- 
quencies for selection of each option by the decision-maker and of the 
contexts by the opponent) entails solution of a set of linear equalities and 
inequalities. First, each set of relative frequencies must sum to 1: 
A,+A2 t ... tA, = 1,andB1t B, ... t Bm= 1. 
Second, each player wants the results, G, from the game to be the best 
possible for himself: 
XAiU..2G,j=1,2,..., nandZBB.U. . IG,j=1,2,..., m.
‘J 1 J’ 
The need is to determine the values for the set of frequencies, Ai and 
Bi, and the value, G, of the game. In general, the solution of a set of linear 
inequalities (called “linear programming”) is an iterative process of search- 
ing for values that are potential solutions and then finding the best among 
them. It is beyond the scope of this article to go into details about that pro- 
cess, and the reader will need to go to a standard text for operations re- 
search or linear programming to find them.4 However, to illustrate the re- 
sults, consider the following game which does not have a saddle point (i.e., 
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max-min for the options is at option 1,context 2 but min-max for the con- 
texts is at context 1, option 1): 
(h i tex ts  
option\ 1 2 3 
1 2 -2 3 
2 -3 7 -1 
The inequalities for the decision-maker are: 
2hl - 3A2 2 G, - 2A1 t 5A2 2 G, 3 A l - A2 2 G, 
Those for the opponent are: 
2B1- 2B2 t 3l33 IG, -3B1 t 5B2 + B3 IG, 
The solution is: 
A1 = 2/3,A2 = 1/3, B 1 =  7/12, B2 = 5/12, B3 = 0, and G =  1/3. 
The result from each of the inequalities except the third one for the 
decision-maker is equal to G, but for that one it is greater than G. That 
means that the opponent does iiot want to select option 3 under any con- 
ditions, which is why B3 should be zero. 
Multiplr P l q m  
So far, the number of players has been just two-the decision-maker 
and the opponent. What happens if there are more than two players, say N 
of them? The crucial point in such games is that players may form coali- 
tions with the objective of gaining advantages by doing s o .  Of course there 
is the implication that there will be mutual agreement among the players 
forming a coalition with respect to the division of utilities among them and 
that the utilities can be transferred among the participants in a coalition 
in accordance with that agreement (what are called “transferable utilities”). 
The representation of an N-player game is essentially parallel to that 
for the two-player game, except that there will be N components to the pay- 
off vectors instead of two. That is, instead of simply (UG,V..) as a pair of I . . .  .
utilities, there will be (U’..,U .., . . . ,U “-.) as an N-fold set o utilities with, 
4 ?1 ‘I
for the moment, the sum of the utilities being equal to zero. Again, each 
player has a set of options among which to choose, with a coalition entail- 
ing agreed-upon choices among the options for the players forming that 
coalition. 
The question at hand is then, what the value of such a game is as rep-
resented by the expected returns for each player, given the possibilities for 
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forming the entire range of coalitions among the players. The answer is a 
beautiful formula, developed by Lloyd S. Shapley (1953).Consider S as one 
among the possible coalitions, with s players joining in it, and let v(S) be 
the sum of the payoffs to the members of the coalition if they cooperate 
(and do not cooperate with any other player). Then, the payoff that each 
player can expect from the game is given by: 
Ui = X i  [~(S)*(S- 1)!*(N- s)!,”!] -XIi [v(S)*s!*(N- s - I)!,”!] 
where the first sum, Xi, is taken over all possible coalitions that include 
player i and the second sum, XIi, is taken over all coalitions that do not in- 
clude player i. The sums together include all possible coalitions. 
Nonzero-SumGames 
Note that, in the matrix representation of the game theoretic model 
for the N-person game as shown above, the sum of the utilities equals zero. 
In particular, for the two-person game, only one utility function has been 
included and, in the numerical illustration, there are only single numbers 
in each element of the matrix. Further, in the discussion above, the utility 
function for the competitor was taken simply as the negative of that for the 
decision-maker, with the view that the results of the game were simply the 
transfer from one person to the other. 
Clearly, it is possible, even likely, that competitors can have fundamen- 
tally different utility functions which cannot be expressed simply as the 
negatives of each other. If so, the matrix representation must consist of 
two values in each cell. To illustrate with a two-person game, let UYbe the 




ODtions 1 2 3 
The sum of the two utility functions, U,, + Vu,would then represent the 
total value of that combination of options and contexts for both players to-
gether. If V = -U , as the prior illustration represented, the game is called 
!I,, 4
a “zero-sum game. If the two utility functions are not simply the negatives 
of each other, the determination of strategy by a given player would still be 
based on maximizing the minimum utility for that player. 
As a principle, game theory assumes that the players in a game are “ra-
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tional,” in the sense that they will each make decisions that are best for their 
individual interests, as expressed by their respective utility functions. That 
implies, in particular, that the relative frequencies of the options and con- 
texts (as defined above) will be determined by the optimal strategy of the 
player whose plays they represent. It is fiirther assumed that both players 
have complete knowledge of the utility fiinctions for each. 
There are good reasons to question either of those assumptions in any 
context more complex than a game. Furthermore, the facts are that while 
the choice of a play in a game may well be made randomly so that the op- 
ponent in making the opposing play is not sure ofwhat it will be, the choice 
in virtually any real situation is likely not to be based on any element of 
randomness but instead will be made as directly as possible. 
CoopPmtiwDecision-iWaking 
In particular, there are applications of game theory for which the as- 
sumption of maximizing individual interests, with max-min as the result- 
ing criterion for choice and with the use of randomization as the means 
for creating mixed strategies, niav be changed. The means for doing so is 
called “bargaining” and the resulting games are called “cooperative games.” 
Basically bargaining is a process of making offers and demands m<th the 
objective of achieving total, joint results that are better than can be obtained 
from simply the competitive game. In such bargaining, of course, the com- 
petitive game sits in the background as the fall-back position in the event that 
bargaining fails and there is no cooperation in arriving at the solution. 
Cooperative games are of special importance for libraries for which 
cooperation injoint solution of operational problems is part of the under- 
lying ethic as well as an economic and operational necessity. These kinds 
of applications therefore will be considered in the context of national in- 
formation policy decisions and of library cooperation within them. As the 
background for that discussion, the following is a brief review of the theo- 
ry underlying cooperative games. 
The basis for the theory of cooperative games was developed by two 
quite remarkable individuals, each a combination of mathematician and 
economist-John F. Nash andJohn C. Harsanyi-who (together with Rein- 
hard Selten) jointly received the Nobel Prize in economics in 1994 for their 
work. The seminal articles, though, were by Nash, and the following descrip- 
tion draws primarily from them, supplemented by material from Harsanyi 
(Nash, 1950, 1953; Harsanyi, 1977). 
Utility Functions in [hoperutiw Games. As was discussed above, to devel- 
op any game-theoretic model, one first needs a measure of utilit)., a means 
by which one can express the decision-maker’s preferences. While such a 
utility function normally need only represent and preserve the order of pref- 
erences, there are two further requirements for application to cooperative 
games. 
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The first added requirement is “transitivity”: If A is preferred to B and 
B is preferred to C, then A is preferred to C. Expressed in terms of the 
utility function, if U(A) > U(B) and U(B) > U(C) ,then U(A) > U(C).  The 
second added requirement is “linearity”: Given a value p, 0 5 p 5 1,with 
a possible option represented by C = p*A t (1- p) *B, then the utility of C 
is the same linear combination of the respective utilities of A and B. Ex-
pressed in terms of the utilityfunction, U(C) = p*U(A) + (1- p)*U(B). 
Note that the linearity requirement necessitates that the utility function 
be quantitative. 
The Mechanism of a Cooperative Game. The theory developed by Nash 
treats situations involving individuals whose interests are neither completely 
opposed nor completely coincident. Decision-making in such situations is 
expected to require mutual discussion and agreement on a rational plan 
ofjoint action. 
It is assumed that each participant has a set of possible mixed strate- 
gies (i.e., weighted combinations of simple strategies) that represent the 
actions that can be taken independent of the other participant. Typically 
the weights for the mixed strategies may be determined by a random pro- 
cess with specified averages. 
For each combination of strategies, say (Sl, S2), there will be resulting 
utilities U(S,, S,) and V(S,, S2)for the two players. Each utility is a linear 
function of S, and S, (because of the assumed property of linearity for the 
utility function). 
Now, the issue in cooperation is to make ajoint decision concerning 
the choice of S, and S, that would maximize thejoint utility. Nash identifies 
a process of negotiation by which thatjoint decision is made and then iden- 
tifies the properties that any “reasonable” solution must have. 
Specifically, (1) there should be a unique solution, (2) any other po- 
tential solution cannot be better, ( 3 ) order preserving transformations of 
the utility functions will not change the solution, (4) the solution is sym-
metrical with respect to the two players, ( 5 )if, for some reason, the set of 
pairs of strategies should be reduced but still contain the solution, it will 
continue to be the solution, (6) restricting the strategies for one player 
cannot increase the value of the solution for that player, (7) there is some 
way to restrict the strategies for both players without increasing the value 
of the solution for a given player. 
Based on those axioms, Nash proves that there is a solution to the game 
that will maximize the total utility. The bottom line is that the solution to 
the game is that pair of strategies that maximizes the product of the possi- 
ble gains over the fallback positions: 
Maximize [U(S,, S2)-XI]*[ V(S,, S2)-X21 
where X, and X, are the expected pay-offs for the respective “fallback posi- 
tions of the two players (i.e., the results from the strategies which would be 
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used without cooperation). The following table (the example used by Nash 
in his article) illustrates a set of choices and the two utility values for each. 
Table 5. 
Choice Cost to A Value to B 
1 -2 4 
2 -2 2 
3 -2 1 
4 -2 2 
5 -4 1 
Choice Value to A Cost to B 
6 10 -1 
7 4 -1 
8 6 -2 
9 2 -2 
The crucial point is that by cooperation, the players can do much bet- 
ter, both individually and together, than their resprctive fallback positions 
would yield. As Nash identifies, the optimum combination of choices is (1, 
2, 3,4,  6, 7,8).For that combination, the payoffs are 12 for A and 5 for B, 
with the criterion product (12 -0)* (5-0) = 60. (The values of zero repre- 
senting the fallback position of noncooperation.) 
One might ask why not include all of the choices except number 5 (in 
which it is evident that there would be a net loss)? Well, note that the val- 
ues of the combination (1,2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9) are 14 for A and 3 for B. Al-
though the total, at 17,indeed is equal to the total for the optimum choice, 
it is clear that B is subsidizing A and is not getting all that should come from 
the collaboration. The criterion product is (14 - 0)* (3  - 0) = 42 and re- 
veals the inequity by being much less than the 60 for the optimum answer. 
Risk Factors. In the bargaining process, a crucial element is the relative 
degree of risk faced by each player at any given point. It is measured by the 
"risk factors" for each player: 
R, = (U(S1'&') -U(S,,S,))/(U(S,',S,') -XI),  
R, = (V(Sl'S*')-V(S,,S,))/(V(S,',S,') -X,) 
If R, >RJ, then player i should prevail over playerj in the choice between 
(S1', S,') and (Sl, S,), since player i has relatively more to gain and playerj 
has relatively more at risk. 
Transfiable Utilities 
However, this does raise the possibility that one might do better. To il-
lustrate the possibilities, in the example given above, let's change the val- 
ues for choice 9 from (2, -2) to (3,-1). It turns out that there are then two 
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combinations of options that have equal values for the Nash criterion: (1, 
2, 3,4,6,7,8) and (1 ,2 ,  3,4,6, 7,8,9).The criterion product for the first 
is still 12*5 = 60, but that for the second is 15*4 = 60. In other words, the 
Nash criterion for each is 60, but the total utility of the second is 19versus 
17 for the first. 
There are two reaons for looking at this new set of values. First, it serves 
to highlight one of the crucial features of the axioms that underlie the Nash 
solution. Specifically, the remarkable contribution that Nash made was not 
only to provide a simple criterion but to prove that it would provide the 
optimum answer and that it would be unique. How then can we have two 
options with the same Nash criterion value? The answer is that given two 
values there are linear combinations of them, lying between them, that are 
also potential answers. 
Thus, let (Xl,Yl) and (X2,Y2) be two options. Then [a*X1 t (l-a)*X,, 
a*Yl t (l-a) *Y2], a I 1 is also an option. The linearity of the utility func- 
tion then allows us to calculate the Nash criterion function: 
N = [a*U(X1)t (l-a)*U(X2)l*[a*V(Yl)+ (l-a)*V(Y,)]. 
To maximize N, set to zero the derivative of it with respect to a: 
2*a[U(X1) -U(X,)l*[VW1) -V(Y,)I +V(Y,)*[U(X,) -
U(X,)I + U(X,)"[VW,) -VW,)I = 0 
Then, a =  (1/2)*(V(Y,)/[V(Yl) -VorJl + U(X,)/[U(X,) -U(X,)I). 
In the example given above, U(X,) = 12, U(X,) = 15, VW1) = 5, and 
V(Y,) = 4. In that case, 
A =  (1/2)*[4/(5 -4) t 15/(15 - 12)] = 1/2. 
The Nash criterion value is then: 
F = (.5*12 + .5*15)*(.5*5t .5*4) = 13.5*4.5= 60.75, 
and that is the unique maximum value. 
The second reason for looking at this example, though, is that it high- 
lights the potential for bargaining between the players with respect to the 
distribution of the total maximum utility. For them to bargain, the utili- 
ties must be transferable, so that player A would be able to give units of 
utility to player B as an incentive to cooperate in such a way as to increase 
the total utility. 
In the example, player A might agree to give player B one and a half 
units if they can cooperate on the option that gives 15 units to A and 4 
units to B. The result would be that A winds up with 13.5 units and B with 
5.5 units. Each is ahead of the option that gave only 12 units to A and 5 
units to B. 
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Later, we will use this example to illustrate the application of coopera- 
tive games in the context of decisions concerning library cooperation. 
Optimization over Total Utilitj 
So far, the optimization has focused totally on criteria that relate to the 
individuals separately. But as the discussion just above should demonstrate, 
there is great potential value if the optimization can consider the total util- 
ity, combining those for each of the two players. 
Here is where Harsanyi provides another beautiful answer (1977, p. 
192).Without going into the details (as given in the reference), the bot- 
tom line is to maximize the Harsanyi criterion function: 
H = [U(S,, S2)- X I ] * [  V(S,, S2) - & I *  [U(S,, S2) + 

V@,, SJ - w, + x2n 

But beyond the Harsanyi criterion is that of Shapley, as described ear- 
lier, which provides the basis for maximum collaboration among all of the 
participants. 
SECTION2.LIBRARIES STRUCTURESWITHIN COOPERATIVE 
We turn now to the potential for use of cooperative game theory in 
support of cooperation among libraries. Of course, libraries have a long 
history of cooperation, perhaps best exemplified by the system for interli- 
brary borrowing and lending. It has been a continuing theme for library 
management for decades. Today, though, there is an expansion of that tra- 
dition into a variety of contexts and purposes and into formalized structures. 
Reason5 for  Library Cooperation 
There are several specific reasons for cooperation among libraries: 
Sharing of Resources. This is certainly the starting point for library co- 
operation. It is explicitly represented by the process for interlibrary borrow- 
ing and lending that has been formalized for decades. But it has generat- 
ed a number of supporting tools in the form of union catalogs, union lists 
of serials, and other cooperative means for determining where desired ma- 
terials may be available. 
Cooperative Acquisitions. This is a means for cooperation that obviously 
depends upon the sharing of resources, but it goes further by formalizing 
agreements in which specific institutions take responsibility for identified 
areas of acquisition. This implies some degree of sharing of funding as well 
as responsibility, and some formal arrangements include provision for pool- 
ing some portions of the acquisitions budgets of the participants. 
Automation. The development of automated systems has frequently been 
a focus of cooperation among libraries. The joint contracting for acquisi- 
tion of a system, the sharing of costs in implementation and in operation, 
the sharing of experience and staff expertise-these have been typical ways 
in which cooperation with respect to automated systems has occurred. 
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Shared Catalogang. The largest concentrated effort at cooperation 
among libraries certainly was the development of systems for shared cata- 
loging. That effort is now represented by the international bibliographic 
databases of OCLC and RLIN. It grew out of the need for cooperation 
among libraries in the conversion of bibliographic records-catalogs espe-
cially-to machine processible forms. The result, of course, is that now vir- 
tually every major library has the catalog for its entire collection in an on- 
line public access catalog (OPAC) . 
Shared Storage. The growth of library collections, whether exponential 
or linear, leads to the problem of allocating materials to alternative places 
for storage. The costs of storage facilities, though, is great enough that 
efficiency requires that they be shared by groups of cooperating libraries. 
Shared storage has therefore been another of the success stones in library 
cooperation. 
Preservation and Access. Perhaps the most dramatic context for library 
cooperation has been that of preservation and access. The underlying prob- 
lem is the literal disintegration of the paper in books, especially those pro- 
duced in the years since the introduction of acidic paper that self-destructs. 
It has been estimated that as much as 25 percent to 30 percent of the hold- 
ings of major research libraries are at risk (Hayes, 1987). To deal with this 
problem, the Council on Library Resources established the Commission on 
Preservation and Access as the focus for management of a major coopera- 
tive effort. The objectives were identified in testimony at a March 17, 1988 
hearing of a Congressional committee: “Commission President Pat Battin 
proposed a model for a national cooperative microfilming program. A goal 
of filming 150,000 volumes a year would require 20 institutions to commit 
to filming 7,500 volumes each. At the 150,000 annual rate, it would take 
about 20 years to film 3 million volumes-the estimated number of volumes 
it would be important to save in order to preserve a representative portion 
of the 10 million or more volumes that will turn to dust by that time” (Com-
mission on Preservation and Access, 1988). 
UtiliQFunctions for Library Cooperation 
We turn now to the potential for application of cooperative game the- 
ories to library cooperation. As was discussed above, to represent a decision-
making problem as a game requires that there be a measure of utility for 
each participant in the game. What are the elements of such a utility mod- 
el for library cooperation? 
Cupital Investments and Operating Costs. We start with the most measur- 
able elements, the capital investments and the operating costs associated 
with alternative options for solution of the decision-making problem. Nor- 
mally, they will be measured in dollars, or equivalent, and can be readily 
accumulated. 
Sometimes the context for possible cooperation may affect existing 
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capital investments. For example, an effort to cooperate in the develop- 
ment of a joint automated system may need to recognize that a partici- 
pant already has a system in place and that cooperation might entail 
changing that system, losing the existing capital investment, and incur- 
ring additional capital costs. 
Sometimes the context may affect current or future capital investments. 
An effort to share acquisitions will usually entail a decision by one of the 
participants to eliminate the capital investment in acquisition and techni- 
cal processing of materials in a specific subject area, under the assumption 
that needs for materials in that subject will be met by another participant. 
This concept underlaid the Farmington Plan, as a national effort in which 
responsibility for collection development in specific subject areas was to be 
assigned to specific institutions. The other institutions could then, in prin- 
ciple, count on coverage o f  the subject fields and concentrate their own 
budgets on their more specific needs. 
Sometimes the context may affect operating costs. As an example, any 
system for interlibrary borrowing and lending or for document delivery 
entails substantial costs in both the borrowing and lending institutions. 
Those operating costs need to be included in any decision concerning 
shared acquisitions. 
A major operating cost in library cooperation is the commitment of the 
time and energy of the library management and professional staff in nego- 
tiation and in governance. Probably the most successfd example of library 
cooperation in the past several decades has been the development of the 
international bibliographic utilities (as represented by OCLC and KLTN). 
The impact on both library costs and libraiy effectiveness has been im- 
mense. But these efforts have necessitated intense involvement of directors 
of libraries, catalogers, and reference staff. The expenditures of time by 
exceptionally valuable persons have been immense. At some time in the 
process of evaluating options for library cooperation, those costs need to 
be considered. 
Library brectiveness. Any utility function for assessing options in library 
cooperation must consider the effect on users and on the overall produc- 
tivity of the library. Unfortunately, these effects are not easily quantifiable. 
Of course, some may be, such as “response time” or “frequency of satisfac- 
tion.” But others, such as “browseability” are not. 
Governance. The utility function will need to recognize issues involved 
in governance. They relate to centralization versus decentralization of’de-
cision-making in operation of cooperative enterprises, to the structure for 
control of policies, and to the relationships of the library to its parent in- 
stitution. These issues are even less amenable to quantification than those 
for effectiveness. 
ProfesssionalEthics. Underlying all of the contexts of library cooperation 
is an ethical commitment of librarianship to the very concept itself. It is em- 
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bedded in the profession and is evidenced in the long-standing commit- 
ment to interlibrary borrowing and lending despite the costs and inequi- 
ties it entails. The major net lenders periodically will complain about the 
costs they incur and the adverse impact on services to their primary con- 
stituencies, but when the decision finally must be made, invariably it is in 
favor of cooperation. 
In a sense, there is an underlying rationale for that professional com- 
mitment in the recognition that no library can be all-encompassing and that 
sharing is the only way to ensure preserving the record of the past and pro- 
viding access to that record. But there appears to be something more than 
simply that pragmatic rationale in the view of librarianship that informa- 
tion indeed is a public good. 
The Consequent Utility Function. Would that one could readily identify 
the utility function that will properly weight and combine this combination 
of quantitative and qualitative factors. In lieu of that, the utility function 
for application to library cooperation must be an individual assessment of 
the relative utility of options and, perhaps, a jointly agreed-upon combina- 
tion of those individual assessments into a mutually acceptable criterion for 
the group of libraries participating in library cooperation. 
Illustrative Applications of Cooperative Games 
Two examples will serve to illustrate the potential for use of coopera- 
tive games in decision-making concerning library cooperation. One con- 
siders cooperative acquisitions and the other considers library automation. 
Cooperative Acquisitions. As a start, for simplicity, let’s suppose that there 
are just two institutions considering an agreement to share acquisitions. If 
one of them will assume responsibility for acquisition in a subject field, the 
second will save the costs of acquisition and technical processing for that 
subject. However, each will incur operating costs in meeting the needs of 
users in the institution served by the second library who need materials in 
that subject field from the first. The utility measure to be used will be quan- 
titative and based simply on the total costs represented by any given choice. 
In Section 1, above, a numerical example was presented to illustrate 
the choice of optimal mixtures of choices, and the following repeats the 
table of values but now interprets them as reflecting the net costs or benefits 
if the options are interpreted as acceptance of subject responsibility. 
The interpretation of this table is that there are nine subject areas be- 
ing considered for cooperative acquisitions. Library A is renowned in the 
first five fields, and library B, in the last four. If library A were to accept re- 
sponsibility for one of the first five fields, there would be estimated costs in 
fulfilling that obligation. Those costs might consist of increased levels of 
acquisition to meet the joint needs; it definitely would include costs in pro- 
viding materials to borrowers from library B. On the other hand, library B 
would save substantial costs in acquisition and technical processing, though 
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TubG 6. 
Choice c o s t  t o  A Value to B 
Subject 1 -2 4 
Subject 2 -2 2 
Subject 3 -2 1 
Subject 4 -2 2 
Subject .i -4 1 
Choice l’alue to .A Cost to B 
SltbJKt 6 10 -1 
Sithlect 7 4 -1 
SUbJCct 8 6 -2 
Subject 9 6 -4 
there woiild be counterbalancing costs in borrowing from library A. The 
values shown are interpreted as the estimates of those respective costs and 
benefits. 
As was described above, this cooperative game has a solution: Library 
A accepts responsibility for subject fields 1through 4 and libraryB for fields 
6 through 8. The remaining fields are left out of the agreement. The net 
gain both to the individual libraries and in total would be substantially great- 
er than if there were 110 agreement to cooperate 
NOMJlet’s complicate the example by including three institutions and 
ten fields. 
Choice 
Number h B c 
1 -2 2 2 
2 1 1 -2 
3 -2 1 0 
4 2 1 -2 
5 -4 1 3 
6 6 -1 4 
7 1 3 -1 
8 3 -2 3 
9 2 -1 1 
10 4 -1 0 
This numerical example will be interpreted as follows:There are three librar- 
ies (A, B, and C;) that are considering a program of cooperative acquisitions. 
They have identified ten subject fields (choices 1 through 10) as potential 
candidates. For each choice, if the value for a given library is negative (such 
as for library A in choice l) ,it will be responsible for that subject field. The 
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value is negative for that library because they will now incur, perhaps, addi- 
tional costs in added acquisitions and, surely, additional costs in providing 
lending services to users from the other libraries. The values for the other 
libraries (library B and C in the case of choice 1,for example) are positive 
because they will now save costs in acquisition in that subject field because 
they can depend upon the host library (library A for choice 1). 
Parenthetically, it should be noted that underlying the choices shown 
above might be more basic choices reflecting the potential for two-party 
agreements. For example, choice 1 might be the sum of two more basic 
choices: (-2,2,2) = (-1,2,0) + (-1,0,2). In this way, if additional libraries were 
to participate, perhaps without even serving as hosts for subject fields, their 
impact on costs would be directly represented in a parallel fashion. 
But, returning to the example as shown, the options available are es- 
sentially the several combinations of the choices, of which there are 1,024 
(i.e., 2l"). The task is to determine the best among those combinations and 
the resulting distribution of benefits (or costs) among the participants. In 
general, it would appear that every choice for which the total of values was 
positive ought to be included, since the group of libraries as a whole would 
experience a net gain. Whether or not a choice for which there was a total 
of zero should be included is clearly debatable, but let's see what happens. 
For this example, it turns out that the maximum Nash Value occurs if 
all of the choices are included, including that for which the total of values 
is negative as well as those for which it is zero. The total individual values 
are then (11,4,8) with a total for the group of 23 and a NashValue of 352. 
However, the option that excludes choice number 3 has total individ- 
ual values (13,3,8), with a total for the group of 24 and a Nash Value of 312. 
It is therefore the option that should be selected if the goal is to maximize 
the total for the group as a whole. 
The Shapley Values are (11.33, 4.33, 8.33),so there would need to be 
transfers from library A to libraries B and C to provide equity, otherwise, 
there would be no reason for library B to agree to that option since it would 
lose in comparison with the Nash Value maximum option (i.e., getting only 
3 instead of 4). The Shapley values are calculated as follows: 
U(A) = (1/3)*11 t (1/6)*15 + (1/6)*19 + (1/3)*24 -
(1/3)*4 - (1/3)*8 - (1/6)*12 = 11.33 
U(B) = (1/3)*4 + (1/6)*15 t (1/6)*12 +(1/3)*24- 
(1/3)*11 - (1/3)*8 - (1/6)*19 = 4.33 
U(C) = (1/3)*8 + (1/6)*19 t (1/6)*12 +(1/3)*24- 
(1/3)*11 - (1/3)*4- (1/6)*15=8.33. 
Cooperation in Automation. Let's suppose that there are several institu- 
tions considering an agreement to cooperate in the installation of a com- 
mon system for automation in their libraries. If they can agree upon a com- 
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mon system, there should be significant benefits in cooperation. For exam- 
ple, as pointed out earlier, there may be savings from joint contracting in 
acquisition of the common system, savings in costs in implementation and 
in operation (such as in shared maintenance and replacement parts), 
efficiencies in sharing of experience and staff expertise, greater effective- 
ness in adding later improvements, and easier sharing of common data files. 
Of course, balancing such benefits from cooperation may be the fact 
that each institution has a substantial investment in its current system. Part 
of that investment may be the residual value in amortization of the initial 
investment in the system. Another part, one likely to weigh even more heavi- 
ly, is the fact that the existing system is well-entrenched in the operating 
procedures of the library and the usage by its patrons. 
All in all, the potential is that the benefits from cooperation will be 
sufficient enough to warrant at least careful evaluation of alternative systems. 
There are thus at least four factors to be considered in the utility func- 
tion for this application of cooperative game theory: (1) existing capital 
investments at each institution, (2) the costs for installation of each poten- 
tial candidate for a replacement system, (3) the net benefits (i.e., difference 
between benefits and operating costs) to be anticipated from each poten- 
tial candidate for a replacement system, and (4) the benefits to be antici- 
pated from cooperation (which may vary from systems to system) by selec- 
tion of a common system. 
To apply cooperative game theory, it is assumed that those four factors 
are commensurate, both across factors and across institutions, so that they 
can be combined by simple arithmetic operations. It is also assumed that 
each factor is measured by a linear function of the size of the institution so 
it is expressible in the form V(ij) = A(ij) + B(ij)*Size(k), with the param- 
eters A and B varying by factor (i) and system (j)and the size varying by 
institution (k).Finally, it is assumed that the parameters for benefits from 
cooperation are a linear function of the number of institutions selecting a 
common system so they are expressible in the form A(4j)  = N(j) *A’(j) and 
B(4j)  = N(.j)*B’(j), where N( j )  is the number of institutions selecting sys- 
tem Sj and the parameters A’(j) and B’(j) are given for each system Sj. 
The following numerical example will illustrate the model for just two 
institutions (see Table 8). 
In this example, the existing investments are, respectively, 6 (for insti- 
tution J1 in system S1) and 3 (for institution 52 in system S2). The poten- 
tial third system, S3, does not provide sufficient benefits to overcome the 
loss of the existing capital investment at J1, but the values in cooperation 
are sufficient to warrant installation of S1 atJ2. However, there needs to be 
compensation for the loss of investment at 52, and the Shapley values, as 
shown, provide the basis for such compensation. If the net operating 
benefits for S3, are increased from 8 to 10, the results are as follows (see 
Table 9).Note that both institutions lose their existing capital investments, 

































































Existing Current Best Net for Shapley Needed 
Institution Size Investment Svstem Choices Best Values Transfers 
J1 3 6 1 3 22 23.00 1.00 
12 2 3 2 3 16 15.00 -1.00 
Net Operating Cooperation 
Installation Cost Benefit Benefit 
System Fixed Linear Fixed Linear Fixed Linear 
s1 2 2 2 5 1 3 
s2 2 1 2 2 1 3 
s3 2 4 2 10 1 3 
but the benefits from both S3 and from cooperation more than compen- 
sate. The Shapley values in this case recognize the greater investment loss 
of institution J1. 
SECTION3. IMPLEMENTATIONN LPM 
Processes for solution of cooperative games have been implemented 
in a program, called LPM-The Library Planning Model. This program is 
in the form of a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet with extensive Visual Basic 
macros. It provides a structure within which several models related to library 
operations and services, management, and planning can be interrelated and 
easily brought together for application to operations in specific libraries and 
to several policy contexts. 
In particular, LPM provides means for entry of data about the popula- 
tions served, materials acquired, services provided to the populations served, 
processes involved in acquiring, cataloging, and preserving materials, and 
facilities related to both users and materials. From those input data, LPM then 
derives an estimation of the staffrequired, both for each category of service 
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or process and in total. Staff estimates are in two categories: direct FTE and 
indirect FTE and for three levels of personnel (professional, nonprofession- 
al, and hourly). To calibrate the staffing estimates from the LPM, means are 
included to compare them with actual staffing, distributed both by adminis- 
trative units and functional areas (using the categories of the model). 
LPM also provides means for assessing the needs for facilities to serve 
users, to store the materials acquired, and for comparing them with the 
input data for facilities already available. It includes means for applying 
models for allocation of materials to alternative means for storage and for 
decisions about the choice between acquisition and access elsewhere. 
And L,PM includes means for using the cooperative game theoretic 
models presented in this article. 
Implementation of Cooperative Gawiesfor Shared Acquisitions 
One process is in support of the model for shared acquisitions, repre- 
senting options (i.e., strateges) that are either independent or are based on 
combinations of possible choices, such as in the example for shared acquisi- 
tions as gven above. Note that in the first example there were 2’ = 512 pos- 
sible combinations for two institutions; in the second example, 21° = 1,024 
for three institutions. A given option then is one of those combinations of 
the nine or ten possible choices. The implementation within LPM .Willallow 
up to nineteen choices and up to five institutions. The Nash, Shapley, and 
Harsanyi criteria have been included in the implementation in LPM. 
Implementation of Cooperative Games for Shared Automation 
The second process is in support of shared automation or similar con- 
texts. Provision has been made to include up to five institutions and up to 
six systems. For each institution and each system, the parameters shown in 
the above illustration need to be entered. That being done, LPM will then 
determine the optimum selections. In principle, different systems might 
best be selected by different coalitions, so LPM then determines the Shap- 
ley values for that optimum by assessing the optimum choice for all possi- 
ble coalitions of institutions and combining them as has been discussed in 
the definition of the Shapley measure. 
CONCLUSION 
Game theory has become a powerful tool in decision-making for busi- 
ness and government contexts in which competitive niotivations are para- 
mount. Even when “cooperative games” are involved, they are typically seen 
in the framework of bargaining for best individual advantage. 
The value of looking at the potential use of this tool in library contexts 
is that cooperation is a part of the ethos of the profession. In that respect, 
it is representative of many kinds of non-profit, non-governmental organi- 
zations for which what is good for the group of participants and even for 
society at large has great weight in decision-making. 
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The intent of this paper has been to identify some potential applica- 
tions of cooperative game theory that would illustrate those kinds of val- 
ues. In doing so, it raises questions about the nature of the utility functions 
and clearly those questions need to be explored; this is especially the case 
for those elements of the utility functions that are essentially qualitative. But 
the framework of game theory provides a context in which such questions 
can be properly posed. 
Beyond that basic intent, the paper has also presented two specific 
examples of those applications with the objective of showing how some of 
the questions might be answered in specific situations. The extension to 
other applications would require developing utility functions appropriate 
to each. Once that is done, the measures (such as those of Nash, Shapley, 
and Harsanyi that are discussed in this paper) provide the means for mak- 
ing effective decisions. 
NOTES 
1. 	This article is based on material from Robert M. Hayes, Models for Library Managemenl, 
Decision-Making, &Planning, San Diego: Academic Press, 2001. 
2. 	 It is important to note that game theory fundamentally represents a means to reconcile 
or combine simultaneous objectives, as represented, for example, by those of the players 
in a game. The solution of the game is that mix of meeting the simultaneous objectives 
that is called “Pareto-optimum,” meaning “the best that could he achieved without disad- 
vantage for at least one objective.” In other words, no objective can be bettered without 
reducing another objective. There is extensive research on the implications of the criteri- 
on of.Pareto-optimum and alternatives for it. (See, for example, Schmid, 1987. Reviewed 
by Boulding, 1979.) 
3. 	 It is important to recognize that optimization of a cost/effectiveness measure usually is in 
the context of boundary conditions (such as “the cost must he less than some maximum” 
or “the effectiveness must be at least some minimum” or both). 
4. 	 Churchman, Ackoff, &Arrow, 1957. (The numerical examples presented in the text above 
are taken from this textbook. 
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